Incentive compensation vs SOX: evidence from corporate acquisition decisions by McColgan, P et al.
1 
 
  
Incentive Compensation vs SOX: Evidence from   
Corporate Acquisition Decisions 
 
DAVID HILLIER, PATRICK McCOLGAN, ATHANASIOS TSEKERIS, 
 And AKSEL S PRESTHUS  
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we use the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 to assess the 
impact of executive option and stock grants on corporate acquisition decisions. 
Amongst its many innovations, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) has limited the value 
and effect of equity-related compensation.  We find strong evidence of a shift in the 
factors driving acquisitions post-SOX. Specifically, while bid premiums have fell 
irrespectively of the type of acquirer, highly incentivised managers have become more 
risk-averse after the passage of the Act. Investors also appear to have recognised the 
effect of a change in equity-related pay. Both market response to acquisition 
announcements and post-acquisition performance have been improved after the 
introduction of SOX but these cannot be attributed to firms that grant high levels of 
incentive compensation to their managers. Our results are robust to a number of 
explanatory factors and confounding events in the post-SOX period. 
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Many factors can lead a firm to undertake corporate acquisitions. Growth opportunities 
(Erel et al., 2012), disruptive technology (Bower, 2001), managerial hubris (Roll, 1986), 
target undervaluation (Edmans et al., 2012), geographical proximity (Ragozzino and Reuer, 
2011; Erel et al., 2012), accounting quality (Erel et al., 2012), synergies (Wang and Xie, 
2009), and managerial herding (Baker et al., 2012; Duchin and Schmidt, 2013) have fairly 
straightforward explanations and predicted effects.  However, there are a number of other 
drivers with less intuitive interpretations that are, nonetheless, important in understanding 
takeover activity and performance. In particular, the role of executive compensation and its 
effectiveness in incentivising managerial decisions is not clear.         
The rationale underlying incentive-based executive compensation is that it aligns the 
objectives of managers to that of stockholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Prior research has 
found strong evidence to support incentive-based compensation and shown that it can 
strengthen company performance (Murphy, 1999; Core et al., 2003), improve shareholder 
value (Billet et al., 2010), increase stock price informativeness (Guay, 1999), and enhance 
corporate investment opportunities (Nohel and Todd, 2005; Conyon et al., 2011). Other work 
has argued that it may lead to abnormally high managerial risk aversion (Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2009) or risk seeking behavior (Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010). 
It is possible that executive compensation is endogenously determined by corporate 
characteristics and governance rather than itself being a driver of managerial behaviour.  For 
example, Morse et al. (2011) find that powerful managers influence their remuneration by 
manipulating benchmark metrics towards those that display best performance.  Furthermore, 
independent boards, which are the cornerstone of modern governance theory, may increase 
executive pay (Guthrie et al., 2012).  Butler and Gurun (2012) and Engelberg et al. (2013) 
show that managerial networks and educational relationships between institutional investors 
and the board are a major factor in executive compensation.  Finally, firms engage in 
strategic peer benchmarking to maximise the pay of their senior executives (Faulkender and 
Yang, 2013). 
In this paper, we utilise the introduction of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to 
investigate the role of executive incentive compensation on corporate acquisition decisions.  
The scope of SOX is exceptionally broad and its implementation affected executive pay in a 
number of ways. The power of individuals is restricted through mandated independence 
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requirements on the board of directors and its remuneration, nomination and audit 
subcommittees (Section 301). In addition, executives became much more accountable to 
shareholders and regulators because of obligatory requirements to certify all financial 
statements and ensure adequate financial control structures (Section 302).  
The increased accountability and disclosure requirements, combined with a powerful 
deterrent of financial and criminal punishment, will have had an undoubted impact on 
executive decision-making. Bargeron et al., (2010) report a significant decline in risky 
investments as a result of SOX, particularly for larger firms with less independent boards. 
Cohen et al., (2013) has shown that executive pay-performance sensitivity decreased 
subsequent to the introduction of SOX, which they argue is directly linked to the provisions 
in the regulation.  It is also consistent with the view that incentive-based compensation is 
negatively related to corporate governance quality and leads to a predominance of lower risk 
investments in well-governed firms (Dicks, 2012). 
While the majority of previous work on this area has focused on changes in the structure 
and size of managerial incentive compensation post-SOX, we contribute to the literature by 
investigating the change in the effectiveness of incentive compensation on acquisition 
decisions after the passage of the Act. Our main research question asks whether the effect of 
executive incentive compensation on mergers and acquisitions has changed as a consequence 
of SOX and we find a substantial shift in the role of these instruments (stock and option 
grants) in driving acquisition risk, bid premiums and post-bid performance.  
In order to answer our research question we attempt to examine two different hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis is whether incentive compensation can offset the impact of SOX in terms 
of decrease in risk-taking activity. Consistent with evidence looking at other forms of capital 
expenditure, we present evidence that the risk of acquisitions fell after SOX. Our results are 
striking. Not only do highly incentivised managers make more risky acquisition decisions 
post-SOX than their low incentivised counterparts, but they are actually those who are more 
heavily affected by the passage of the Act having become significantly more risk-averse. The 
second hypothesis tests whether firms that grant high levels of incentive compensation to 
their managers continue to make acquisition decisions that create more value to shareholders 
than their lower incentivised counterparts in the post-SOX period. Again, the answer is an 
emphatic no. The rejection of the above two hypotheses shows a considerable change in 
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managerial incentives and the effectiveness of incentive compensation on acquisition 
decisions post-SOX.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section I presents our data and 
outlines the research methodology. Section II provides a description of the sample statistics. 
Section III presents and discusses the empirical results. Section IV summarises and 
concludes.  
 
I. Sample and Methodology 
The Thomson One SDC database for Mergers and Acquisitions is used to identify all US 
M&A activity between January 1, 1993, and December 31, 2010. A transaction is included in 
our sample only after meeting the following criteria: the transaction must be completed; it 
must have a disclosed deal value of at least $1 million
1
; both the announcement and effective 
date of the transaction will have occurred within the sample period; both the bidder and target 
are US firms; the acquirer is a publicly listed company and should own less than 50 percent 
of the target’s shares six months prior to the acquisition announcement and must acquire at 
least 50 percent of the shares in the transaction so as an explicit change of control to be 
ensured. In order to avoid the often vague definition of transactions contained in the SDC 
database, we follow Aktas et al. (2013) including in our sample only transactions classified as 
mergers, acquisitions, acquisitions of majority interest, acquisitions of assets, acquisitions of 
certain assets, acquisitions of remaining interest, and exchange offers. 
The sample was further constrained to include only those transactions where the bidding 
firm has executive compensation data in ExecuComp for the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement and stock price and accounting data available in CRSP and Compustat at the 
time of acquisition announcement. This resulted in a final sample of 7,859 corporate 
acquisitions made by 1,926 US firms between 1993 and 2010. Regarding the target firms, 
only 1,887 of them were publicly listed at the time of acquisition. There is also a slight 
variation in the number of observations across tables because of a lack of specific data 
availability in some months before or after the M&A transaction took place.
2
  
                                                          
1 
All dollar values in the analysis are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2010 USD. 
2
 Running the analysis with a balanced sample made no difference to the results and so we opted for an 
unbalanced sample to maximize the statistical power of our tests. 
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We define incentive compensation as the proportion of total executive compensation 
comprised of new option and restricted stock grants, aggregated across the company’s top 
five highest paid directors in the year preceding the acquisition announcement. We classify 
firm-year observations as having high levels of incentive compensation (High IC) if their 
percentage of incentive compensation is above the annual median of all companies in the 
S&P ExecuComp database for that year. Otherwise, our sample firms are characterized as 
low incentive compensation ones (Low IC). We also divide the sample into pre- and post-
SOX eras with the breakpoint being the date of SOX enactment (30 June 2002). If the 
acquisition announcement has been made before 30 June 2002, the firm belongs to the pre-
SOX sample; otherwise, the transaction is classified as post-SOX. 
Examining the effectiveness of incentive compensation and the quality of acquisition 
decisions post-SOX poses a number of difficulties. This period is characterised by a number 
of events and distinct periods, such as the market downturn after the clash of the internet 
bubble, the adoption of SFAS No. 123R and the recent financial crisis that could drive the 
findings of our analysis. Without proper control for these effects, any empirical results 
couldn’t be safely attributed to the impact of SOX. We follow Cohen et al. (2013) to control 
for these confounding events. Regarding the crash of the internet bubble and the following 
market downturn, we form a sub-sample of the bidders with an acquisition announcement 
date within the years 2000 and 2001. Cumulative stock returns for these bidders are 
calculated for the period August 2000 to August 2001 during which the strongest impact of 
the internet crash is documented (Cohen et al., 2013). Based on these returns, we form deciles 
where the highest decile corresponds to the most positive returns. The ranking of these 
deciles is represented by the variable Internet B.Crash which is used to control for the impact 
of the internet crash. 
The passage of SFAS No. 123R had a major, adverse impact on the use of option-based 
compensation (Brown and Lee, 2007). Since option grants is one of the two major 
constituents of the Incentive Compensation variable used in this paper, it is important to 
control for the effect of this Statement on our analysis. While the effective date of SFAS No. 
123R was originally scheduled to be the first fiscal quarter after the 15
th
 of June 2005, this 
was later modified by the SEC to be the first fiscal quarter of the first fiscal year after the 15
th
 
of June 2005. Thus, the dummy variable SFAS123R is included in our analysis which takes 
the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement had been made in 2006 and 0 otherwise. 
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Similar to the treatment of the passage of SFAS No. 123R, we use year dummy variables for 
the period 2007-2009 to control for the impact of the financial crisis on our results. 
When we examine the relation between incentive compensation and the change in bidder’s 
risk after acquisition, we take into consideration the fact that these two variables may be 
determined simultaneously. From the one hand, the level of managers’ incentive 
compensation will have an impact on the riskiness of investment decisions. (Datta et al, 2001; 
Lambert et al, 1991; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Smith and Stulz; 1985). On the other 
hand, the structure of managerial compensation and the level of incentive pay may be 
determined by the firm based on the desired level of risk, especially in the stricter regulatory 
environment post-SOX. In line with Coles et al. (2006) and Cohen et al. (2013) we use three-
stage least squares regressions (3SLS) to avoid any potential bias of OLS estimators. 
The market reaction to an acquisition announcement is measured by the bidder’s abnormal 
stock price return for a two-day event window (-1, 0), where day ‘0’ is the acquisition 
announcement date. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are computed using the market 
model method (Brown and Warner, 1985) and the expected return for bidder i is given by the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression:  
                        
where    is the regression intercept,    is the slope coefficient,      is the return on the CRSP 
S&P 500 Value-Weighted Market Index, and    the random error term. The CRSP Value-
Weighted Market Index is used to proxy for the market index (Antoniou et al., 2007; 
Golubov et al., 2012; Alexandridis et al., 2013). Market model parameters are estimated over 
a 200-day period ranging from 220 to 20 days prior to the acquisition announcement date. 
Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHRs) are used to estimate the two-year post-acquisition 
stock price performance (see Ritter, 1991; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Spiess and Affleck-
Graves, 1999; Bi and Gregory, 2011). The BHR is calculated as follows: 
       [∏(      )   
 
   
]       
where t = 1 is defined as the first trading day after acquisition, Ri,t is the return on stock i on 
day t and Ti is the two-year anniversary date of the effective acquisition date for company i. 
A Similar method is used for the calculation of one-year pre-acquisition performance. Only 
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abnormal BHRs (using the CRSP Value-Weighted Market Index as benchmark) are included 
in our analysis. 
 The tables presenting the empirical results consist of two panels. The first panel is 
based on univariate analysis and presents the size and the change of the variable under 
examination between the different subsamples (High IC vs Low IC, Pre-SOX vs Post-SOX). 
The second panel implements multivariate analysis to test the robustness of the results against 
a number of explanatory variables based on previous research findings. 
 
II. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics regarding the distribution of the mergers and 
acquisitions included in the analysis. Cash transactions dominated the period, with 4,034 
transactions compared to 1,500 equity and 2,325 hybrid (for example, cash plus equity, 
equity plus debt, earnout plus cash) transactions. The average deal value was $616.74 
million, but there was considerable variability in magnitude across years.  The effect of the 
dotcom crash in 2001 and global credit crunch that started in 2007 is evident from the 
substantial drop in acquisitions during these periods.
3
 Deal values exhibit an analogous trend 
over the same period with the exception of 2009, where the average deal value was $1.005 
billion. This was caused by a number of very large acquisitions during the year.
4
 The impact 
of SOX on M&A financing is also clear. Before 2002, 40.6 percent of acquisitions were 
financed entirely by cash but this increased to 64.8 percent after SOX introduction. Equity 
only transactions have become steadily less popular, comprising only 4.3 percent of all 
transactions after 2002.  
Panels B and C of table 1 present the distribution of acquisitions made by firms that grant 
to their managers high (High IC) and low (Low IC) percentages of incentive compensation 
respectively. The drop in acquisition activity during the internet crash and the recent financial 
crisis is also evident here regardless of the level of equity-related pay. Similarly, the structure 
and size of incentive compensation does not seem to have affected the substitution of equity 
for debt as a method of payment post-SOX. High IC firms finance 40 percent (34 percent) of 
                                                          
3 Moeller et al. (2004) and Masulis et al. (2007) note a similar pattern. 
4
 Examples include the purchase of Sun Microsystems by Oracle ($7.4 billion), Affiliated Computer Systems by 
Xerox ($8.5 billion), Perot Systems by Dell ($3.7 billion), 3Com by HP ($3.2 billion), and Tandberg by Cisco 
($3.4 billion).  
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their acquisitions entirely by cash (equity) but this figure has increased (dropped) to 68 
percent (4 percent) after 2002. Likewise, Low IC firms use only cash (equity) to pay for 41 
percent (29 percent) of their acquisitions pre-SOX while 60 percent (5 percent) of their 
transactions are financed entirely by cash (equity) post-SOX. These patterns indicate that in 
corporate governance period characterized by increased monitoring, directors chose less 
costly modes of financing in terms of corporate control. Harford et al. (2012) show that 
entrenched managers prefer cash to stock as a method of payment in acquisitions in order to 
avoid monitoring from potential large blockholders. Also, High IC firms appear to make 
more expensive (larger) acquisitions than Low IC bidders. The difference is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level and comes from the post-SOX period. 
As noted by Shue (2013), the SEC announced new disclosure rules in 2006 and this led 
to changes in the reporting of executive remuneration from the original 1992 disclosure 
requirements. Under the 1992 system, total remuneration is defined as the sum of salary, 
bonus, other annual short-term compensation, total value of granted restricted stock, total 
value of granted stock options (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts and all 
other long-term compensation. Under the new 2006 reporting format, total remuneration is 
the sum of salary, bonus, non-equity incentive plan compensation, deferred compensation 
earnings, and grant-date fair value of option and stock awards to the top five executives. 
After 2006, option fair values are calculated as per the guidelines in FASB Statement No.123 
(Revised 2004).
5
   
Table 2 presents executive compensation data both before and after the introduction of 
SOX. Panel A includes compensation characteristics for our total sample of 7,859 
acquisitions and shows an important drop in option grants post-SOX. Prior to SOX, executive 
stock options made up 57.9 percent of executive compensation, falling to 40.6 percent 
subsequent to the regulation.  Options were largely replaced by restricted stock grants, which 
grew from being a very minor part of executive pay to becoming highly significant (5.7 
percent pre-SOX to 19.4 percent post-SOX). With the exception of executive stock options, 
                                                          
5 In contrast to the 1992 disclosure requirements, which used the Black-Scholes option pricing model to value 
granted stock options, FASB Statement No.123 (Revised 2004) does not specify the valuation model to be used 
in calculating the fair value of stock options, but the expectation is that some variant of Black-Scholes (such as 
Black-Scholes-Merton) or a lattice model will be used. Shue (2013) recalibrated her post-2006 data to be 
consistent with 1992 reporting requirements for the full sample period and in robustness checks found there to 
be little difference in using both formats. In our own robustness tests, we have followed Shue (2013)’s 
methodology and find very little change. As a result, we use the unadjusted fair value of granted options after 
2006 as provided by Execucomp. 
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executive pay increased in all areas. Panel B presents compensation data for those S&P firms 
listed in the ExecuComp database that undertook no acquisition activity during our sample 
period
6
. The significant drop in the use of executive stock-options post-SOX is also evident 
for non-acquiring firms. Similarly to our M&A sample, restricted stock grants seem to gain 
ground as a component of incentive compensation after 2002 replacing executive stock-
options.  The figures are consistent with Heron et al. (2007), Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2009), Chung (2008), Wang (2010) and Cohen et al. (2013) in that the relative importance of 
executive stock options fell after SOX.  Moreover, in line with Guthrie et al. (2012) and 
Cohen et al. (2013) we don’t find a decline in total compensation post-SOX. In contrast, 
when we examine the aggregate compensation of the top five executives, without limiting our 
analysis to CEOs’ contracts only, we document an increase in total compensation post-SOX. 
Comparing acquiring with non-acquiring firms
7
 for the period 1992-2010 we see that 
acquirers compensate their directors more generously in all areas with the exception of “other 
forms of compensation”8 post-SOX. Bidders incentivize their managers more by offering 
higher levels of equity-related pay and bonus payment both pre and post-SOX. The results of 
the difference-in-difference regressions on the right column show that bidders have 
significantly increased executive bonus and restricted stock grants after the passage of the 
Act compared to non-acquiring firms. 
Panels C and D contain executive compensation data for High and Low IC acquirers 
respectively. In line with our discussion so far, High IC firms have considerably reduced the 
use of executive stock options post-SOX replacing a significant part of them with restricted 
stock grants. As a result, our measure of incentive compensation has experienced only a very 
small increase from 60.2 percent before the passage of the Act to 63.3 percent post-SOX. 
Although the difference is statistically significant, it can’t be considered too important 
economically. However, the picture is different for Low IC acquirers. Both stock and option 
grants have increased post-SOX with the difference being statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. This has taken the level of incentive compensation up to 21.8 percent but it still 
remains well below that of High IC firms. Panel E compares executive compensation data 
from Panels C and D. High IC firms compensate their managers more generously than Low 
IC firms in terms of salary, incentive compensation (stock and option grants) and total 
                                                          
6 This sample contains 664 firms and 6,668 firm-year observations. 
7 See Panel B columns about difference in mean and median between M&A and non-acquiring firms. 
8 This type of compensation includes perquisites and other personal benefits, contributions to defined 
contribution plans, life insurance premiums, consulting fees etc. 
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compensation both before and post-SOX. The coefficients of the difference-in-difference 
regressions show that the increase in stock grants post-SOX was significantly higher for High 
IC acquirers compared to Low IC bidders but the managers of High IC bidders experienced a 
significant drop in their stock option grants for the same period compared to the managers of 
Low IC acquiring firms. The latter stems from the different policy followed by Low IC 
acquirers regarding executive stock option grants compared to the rest of S&P firms 
(acquirers and non-acquirers) post-SOX. 
 
III. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present the results of our main empirical tests.  In Section III.A, we ask 
if the risk of corporate acquisitions changed as a result of SOX and whether incentive 
compensation (IC) accentuated the change. Section III.B considers bid premiums, looks at the 
effect of incentive compensation on premiums, and how SOX altered this relationship. 
Differences in the market reaction to acquisition announcements and stock price performance 
between bidders with high and low levels of IC and the determinants of these differences are 
discussed in Sections III.C and III.D 
III.A. Incentive Compensation and Investment Risk 
One of the key questions stemming from the principal-agent problem is whether a firm’s 
managers will forgo profitable risky investments to avoid bearing personal risk that may be 
associated with these projects. There is contrasting evidence that higher levels of incentive-
based compensation in the form of restricted stock and options can lead to risk-increasing 
acquisitions by managers (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Conyon et al., 2011). This is 
placed against research which shows that increased sensitivity of managerial compensation to 
stock performance can make undiversified directors even more risk averse (Holmstrom, 
1979; Lambert et al., 1991).  
After the passage of SOX, a significant decrease in risky investments has been 
documented (Bargeron et al, 2009). We attempt to show whether the incentives for risky 
decisions provided by equity-linked compensation can offset the impact of stricter regulation 
on risk-taking activity. To investigate the effectiveness of incentive compensation on 
acquisition decisions, we examine the change in standard deviation of bidders’ returns after 
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an acquisition and ask whether SOX affected the risk-taking behaviour of managers by 
driving down the risk of these decisions. Following Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), Datta et 
al. (2001) and Bargeron et al (2009) we measure the change in bidder’s risk as the difference 
in standard deviation of stock returns between the post-acquisition period and the period 
before the acquisition. The estimation period is 6 months (126 trading days) preceding and 6 
months following the acquisition effective date. We truncate the distribution of standard 
deviation of stock returns at its 1st and 99th percentiles in order to avoid the impact of any 
extreme outliers on our results. 
Panel A of Table 3 presents univariate results regarding the effect of SOX on the 
riskiness of acquisition decisions. It can be seen that the post-acquisition bidder’s risk fell 
significantly after the introduction of the Act in 2002. This is consistent with research that 
investigates the effect of SOX on other investment decisions and found more risk-averse 
behaviour subsequent to its introduction (Bargeron et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2012; Dicks, 
2012). Given the importance of corporate acquisitions to a firm’s management and the level 
of regulatory scrutiny surrounding these types of transactions, it is perhaps not surprising that 
firms became more risk averse after SOX.  
  However, a more striking result is evident. Whereas SOX had no effect on Low IC 
firms, for firms with high levels of executive incentive compensation there is a significant 
decrease in post-acquisition risk.  Prior to SOX, our results are very similar to Datta et al., 
(2001) in that there is a positive relationship between post-acquisition risk and equity-related 
compensation for all firms. Specifically, the standard deviation of High IC firms increased by 
an average of 14 percent after an acquisition compared to only 7 percent for Low IC firms.  
In contrast, subsequent to the SOX reforms, the managers of firms whose compensation is 
more sensitive to performance seem to have become more risk averse than their Low IC 
counterparts. 
The first model of 3SLS regressions in panel B confirms the univariate results. Incentive 
Compensation is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm is characterised as 
High IC and 0 otherwise. SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition 
announcement was made on or after the 30th of July 2002. The interaction term ICxSOX 
shows the significant drop in post-acquisition risk of High IC firms after the passage of the 
Act. Furthermore, the decrease in post-acquisition risk after the introduction of SOX more 
than offsets the increase in acquisition risk due to incentive compensation in the pre-SOX 
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period. The results cannot be attributed to SOX though unless we properly control for a 
number of factors that could also affect firms’ risk. Model 2 controls for two such 
confounding effects: the market downturn that followed the crash of the internet bubble and 
the passage of SFAS No. 123R (Cohen et al., 2013). Both events are expected to lead to a 
reduction in risk-taking activity, especially the passage of the Statement in 2006 which 
considerably limited the use of executive stock options. The signs of the coefficients for the 
above two events are according to expectations and statistically significant for the internet 
crash period. However the impact of SOX on High IC firms remains both statistically and 
economically strong
9
.  
A number of firm-specific factors can also have an impact on a company’s risk. Model 3 
of panel B controls for the most important of these factors. Bargeron et al. (2009) find that 
the decline in risky investments post-SOX is greater for larger firms. Under the new 
regulation, larger and more complex firms may be facing higher risk for financial 
misstatements which could lead to a decrease in risky investments. Following Coles et al. 
(2006) and Cohen et al. (2013) we use the logarithm of sales (Log_Sales) as a proxy for firm 
size. Since we examine the change in managerial incentives, ownership can always play a key 
role as it changes the behaviour of executives. We define Ownership as the sum of stocks 
owned by the top five executives at the year-end prior to the acquisition announcement 
divided by the total shares outstanding
10
. The positive relation between incentive 
compensation and risk pre-SOX could be due to increase in leverage of High IC firms (Datta 
et al., 2001). To control for the latter, we also include Leverage as an explanatory variable, 
computed as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Similarly, the decrease in risk post-SOX 
could also be due to the decrease in leverage during the same period. In order to confirm that 
our results are not driven by such a change in leverage, we construct a dummy variable 
(Decrease in Leverage) that takes the value of 1 if the firm has reduced its leverage from the 
year end preceding the acquisition announcement to the announcement year end. 
Even after controlling for all the above factors, the impact of SOX on High IC firms 
remains both statistically and economically strong. The downturn of the market after the 
                                                          
9 We also control for the period of financial crisis using dummy variables for the years 2007-2009 as we expect 
this period to have the same impact on risk-taking activity as that of the internet crash. The regression 
coefficient confirms our expectations but the impact of financial crisis on acquisition risk is not statistically 
significant. Since there is a considerable overlapping between the financial crisis and the post-SOX period, we 
opted not to report these results. 
10 Following McConnell and Servaes (1990), we truncate the distribution of executive ownership at their 1st and 
99th percentiles in order to avoid the impact of any extreme outliers on our results. 
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internet crash and the passage of SFAS No. 123R lead to a reduction in risk-taking activity 
but they do not affect the impact of SOX. The regression output also shows that higher levels 
of ownership make executives less risk averse, aligning their interests with those of 
shareholders. This relation does not seem to have changed post-SOX. Including ownership as 
an explanatory variable does not affect the significant positive relation between incentive 
compensation and risk-taking activity pre-SOX, confirming previous research findings (Datta 
et al., 2001; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987). We don’t find any important relation between 
the acquirer’s size and the standard deviation of stock returns after controlling for the impact 
of SOX and other confounding effects
11
. 
The results suggest that while SOX has been beneficial in increasing managerial 
accountability, it has had some unintended consequences particularly relating to the incentive 
effect of equity-related pay. Not only has incentive compensation not managed to offset the 
impact of SOX, but it has also significantly altered the incentives of managers regarding risk-
taking activity compared to the pre-SOX period.  Post-SOX, the heightened regulatory 
scrutiny and punishments imposed by the Act have led to significantly more risk-averse 
behaviour, especially in those firms where incentives are expected to be strongest.  
III.B. Acquisition Premium 
Extant evidence has shown that managers often pursue value-destroying acquisitions and 
pay a premium above what the firm is actually worth to shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1988). Harford et al. (2012) documents that bid premiums are too high and managers’ top 
priority is the reinforcement of control rather than value creation for shareholders. Roll 
(1986) argues that, because of managerial hubris, decision-makers overestimate the value of 
target firms and overpay in corporate acquisitions.  
Table 4 examines whether there is a significant difference between acquisition premiums 
paid by firms that award high and low levels of incentive compensation to their directors and 
whether the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act led to more conservative behaviour among 
managers. Panel A presents information on the actual premium based on univariate analysis. 
The acquisition premium is measured as the difference between the price offered by the 
bidder and the target stock price four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement, expressed 
                                                          
11 We also control for CEO tenure but the results do not change. However, due to luck of data (we use 
ExecuComp to identify the date each director became CEO) the number of observation are reduced to 3,658 
which has a small impact on the statistical significance of the results. Thus, we choose not to report these results 
here. 
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as a percentage of the same target stock price
12
. We expect that the increased accountability 
of managers and the stricter regulations post-SOX will have set a limit to the money 
managers offer for bid premiums, leading to a decrease in the overpayment for targets. 
Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act appears to have had a major impact on bid premiums, with 
falls across the full sample after SOX was introduced.  Before SOX, High IC firms made an 
average (median) bid premium of 48.80 percent (42.21 percent) which is significantly greater 
than the average (median) premium of 39.37 percent (31.82 percent) paid by the same type of 
firms post-SOX. Similarly, the average (median) premium paid by Low IC firms is 
considerably reduced from 46.79 percent (39.00 percent) pre-SOX to 37.39 percent (29.72 
percent) post-SOX. The results show that the passage of the Act has reduced the premiums 
managers pay for targets irrespectively of the level of executive incentive compensation.  
The multivariate regressions in Panel B test the results against factors that could also 
have an important effect on the size of acquisition premiums. The first model simply 
confirms the findings of the univariate tests showing a statistically and economically 
significant decrease of acquisition premiums post SOX. The explanatory variables are 
defined as in section III.A. The second model controls for the downturn of the market 
following the internet crash (2000-2001) and the financial crisis (2007-2009) which could 
also affect the premiums acquirers pay for targets
13
. While the relation between market 
downturn and acquisition premiums cannot really be predicted, we see that in both periods an 
increase in premiums is documented. This could be considered as an increased “risk 
premium” in periods of higher market instability and uncertainty. The impact of SOX on bid 
premiums remains strong. 
Model 3 introduces a number of firm-specific explanatory variables. Jensen (1988) 
argues that managers of good performers and excess cash may overpay for targets. We 
measure past performance (Runup) as the acquirer’s abnormal buy-and-hold stock return for 
one year preceding the acquisition. The regression results confirm Jensen’s (1998) theory of 
free cash flows. Good past performers tend to overpay for targets pre-SOX but the passage of 
                                                          
12 Similar to our methodology in the previous section, we exclude outliers at the 1 percent and 99 percent 
percentiles of the acquisition premium distribution. 
13 While we controlled for the passage of SFAS No. 123R in the previous section where we were examining the 
change in acquirer’s risk, it doesn’t seem to be any economically meaningful relation between this Statement 
and acquisition premiums. 
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SOX seems to have corrected this sign of managerial hubris
14
. Travlos (1987), Eckbo and 
Longohr (1989),  Linn and Switzer (2001), Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), Alexandridis et al. 
(2013), and Giuli, (2013) show that the method of payment in corporate acquisitions can 
reveal important information regarding a target’s value. We control for the method of 
payment using the dummy variable Cash which takes the value of 1 if the transaction has 
been financed entirely by cash and the dummy variable Equity which takes the value of 1 if 
the transaction has been financed 100 percent with equity. There is an indication of lower 
premiums if the transaction is financed only by equity before SOX but our results remain 
robust to the mode of payment used in the acquisition. In addition, we examine the 
hypothesis whether firms with higher growth opportunities induce their managers to spend 
more when acquiring a target. In support of this, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) have found that 
“Glamour” firms (firms with high Market-to-Book ratio) destroy value in acquisitions. We 
use the Market-to-Book ratio (M/B) as a proxy for growth opportunities based at the month-
end prior to the acquisition announcement date as book value of total assets minus book value 
of equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of total assets. The regression 
output confirms our prediction as high M/B firms seem to pay higher premiums. The results 
are significant only at the 10 percent level though. Similar to the previous section, we also 
test whether Ownership can affect managerial incentives in terms of acquisition premiums 
but we find no statistically significant relation.  
The last regression model in Panel B examines whether the payment of higher premium 
is linked to higher synergies stemming from the acquisition. Should that be the case, a 
reduction of premiums post-SOX may not be desirable. Insightful managers may be able to 
foresee the future value created by successful acquisitions being thus willing to pre-pay a part 
of this value in order to complete the transaction. We use the acquirer’s two-year abnormal 
buy-and-hold stock return following the acquisition (2-year_ABHRs) to identify the possible 
value created by the acquisition. The results show no statistical significant relation between 
the size of the premium and bidder’s post acquisition performance. Our findings, which 
remain strong throughout all robustness tests, indicate a significant decrease in acquisition 
premiums post-SOX in all types of acquiring firms which is beneficial to the bidder’s 
shareholders.  
 
                                                          
14 Using the sum of net operating, investing and financing cash flows standardized by total assets as proxy for 
past performance didn’t change the results.  
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III.C. Market Reaction on Acquisition Announcements 
We examine the market reaction on corporate acquisition announcements by estimating 
the bidder’s cumulative abnormal return over a two-day event window (-1,0). For those firms 
with more than one acquisition announcement on the same date we include only the 
transaction with the highest deal value to avoid biasing our results. Moreover, since we use 
an estimation period of 220 to 20 days before the acquisition announcement for the market 
model, we include only those acquisitions with an announcement date at least 320 calendar 
days (220 trading dates) later than the previous acquisition announcement for the same firm. 
Thus, we ensure that there are no overlapping periods in our CAR analysis that may induce 
spurious correlation that could affect our results.
15
   
 Panel A of table 5 presents average and median CARs for our sample firms pre and post-
SOX. The “Total Sample” column shows a relative increase in CARs post-SOX (not 
statistically significant though), but the next two columns indicate that this increase is due a 
better market reaction regarding acquisitions made by Low IC firms (the increase is 
significant at the 10 percent level). Past research has shown a positive relation between 
equity-based-compensation and bidder’s CARs around acquisition announcement (Datta et 
al., 2001). We find a find a similar relation for the pre-SOX period but not statistically 
significant. In contrast, acquisitions made by low incentivised managers seem to experience a 
better market reaction after the passage of the Act. The combined effect of decrease in High 
IC firms’ CARs and increase in Low IC firms’ CARs has led to a higher average (median) 
CAR for Low IC bidders of 0.36 percent (0.22 percent) compared to that of High IC acquirers 
post-SOX. 
Panel B identifies the determinants of acquisition CARs by regressing them against 
managerial incentives and other variables that have been found to be important in prior 
research. Our dependent variable is the bidder’s two-day (-1,0) cumulative abnormal return 
around the acquisition announcement. All explanatory variables are defined as in the previous 
sections. The first model confirms the results of univariate analysis according to which there 
is an improvement in the CARs of bidders around acquisition announcement post-SOX. 
However, this is not the case for all types of acquirers. When bidder’s managers are highly 
incentivised (in terms of compensation) post-SOX, the market reaction on their acquisition 
announcements is inferior to that in the pre-SOX period. Model 2 controls for the 
                                                          
15
 In robustness tests, we omitted the overlapping period criterion with little change in our results. 
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confounding event periods identified earlier in the paper. For at least two of these periods we 
expect a negative relation with the bidder’s cumulative abnormal return given the market 
downturn that followed the internet crash (2000-2001) and the financial crisis (2007-2009). 
Thus, it is necessary to test whether the lower CARs of High IC firms post-SOX are really 
due to higher levels of incentive compensation and not due to the adverse market conditions 
during these periods. The results confirm that incentive compensation post-SOX is not as 
effective as it used to be pre-SOX. The signs of the confounding periods’ coefficients are 
indeed negative and the passage of SFAS No. 123R seems to have negatively affected 
bidder’s CARs. Nevertheless, the impact of incentive compensation on CARs post-SOX 
remains negative and significant at the 10 percent level
16
. 
Model 3 controls for firm-specific factors that according to previous research can change 
the size and direction of bidder’s CAR around acquisition announcements. Loughran and 
Vijh (1997), Datta et al. (2001) and Alexandridis et al. (2013) have shown that acquisitions 
financed with cash are perceived more positively by the market. Thus, using dummy 
variables (Cash, Equity), we control for acquisitions financed entirely by cash as well as for 
acquisitions financed only with equity in order to test the way the method of payment can 
affect market reaction. We also examine whether there is any connection between the market 
reaction around the acquisition announcement date and the stock-price performance 
preceding the acquisition announcement (Runup) as investors could react more positively to 
announcements made by better-performing firms. Our next explanatory variable is 
Ownership as it has been documented that high levels of executive ownership can negatively 
affect M&A activity (Caprio et al., 2011) or cause an adverse market reaction around the 
acquisition announcement date (Bauguess and Stegemoller, 2008). In addition, we include 
acquirer’s Market-to-Book ratio in our analysis in order to make sure that our results are not 
driven by any possible endogeneity between bidder’s growth prospects and high proportions 
of incentive compensation. 
According to our expectations, the results show a statistically and economically positive 
impact of cash acquisitions on market reaction confirming previous research
17
. The positive 
impact of SOX is now statistically insignificant indicating that it is the replacement of equity 
                                                          
16 The results in the first two models are significant at the 10 percent level using robust, heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors.  
17 It should be noted that when Cash is included as an explanatory variable, the explanatory power of our model 
increases considerably. 
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for cash
18
 post-SOX that has driven the increase in CARs for Low IC acquirers. However, 
while High IC firms have also substantially replaced equity for cash as a method of payment 
in the post-SOX period, the negative impact of compensation incentives on market reaction 
remains strong. No other explanatory variable is statistically important apart from the 
bidder’s Market-to-Book ratio which is negative and important at the 5 percent level. This is 
in line with the findings of Rau and Vermaelen (1998) that it is actually the “Glamour”, high 
Market-to-Book ratio, firms that are responsible for the destruction of value in corporate 
acquisitions. 
Model 4 combines those variables from models 2 and 3 that were found to have a 
statistically important explanatory power
19
. Even when examining all these important factors 
together, none of them loses its level of statistical significance. The negative impact of 
incentive compensation on bidders’ CARs after controlling for confounding events and firm-
specific factors could probably be a good justification of the reduction of this type of 
compensation post-SOX as documented in previous studies (Cohen et al., 2013; Dicks, 2012). 
This is in line with our results about the change in acquirer’s risk in the post-acquisition 
period. While pre-SOX higher incentive compensation was leading managers to better quality 
and more risky acquisitions, after the passage of the Act, highly incentivised managers seem 
to prefer acquisitions of lower quality and risk. This indicates that SOX has considerably 
altered managerial incentives stemming from equity-related compensation. Moreover, the 
positive relation between cash acquisitions and market reaction around the announcement 
date may be another reason, apart from that of securing corporate control, for the substitution 
of equity for cash as a payment method after 2002. 
III.D. Incentive Compensation and Long-term Post-acquisition Performance. 
Although SOX clearly impacted upon acquisition decisions and the incentive effect of 
executive compensation, the long-term performance of bidders may have been unaffected.  
Datta et al. (2001) finds that stronger managerial incentives were linked to higher post-
acquisition performance prior to SOX.  However, with the impact of the Act on managerial 
risk-seeking behaviour, it is possible that the factors that drive acquisition performance may 
have changed in the years after SOX was introduced.  We first examine whether there has 
been a change in long-term acquisition performance and then investigate the factors 
                                                          
18 See Table 1. 
19 Creating a model that includes all variables from models 2 and 3 gives us identical results but a lower number 
of observations. 
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underlying the change.  We measure long-term post-acquisition performance using the 
acquirer’s Abnormal Buy-and-Hold Return (ABHR) which is defined as the difference in 
bidder’s 2-year BHR subsequent to the acquisition effective date and the CRSP S&P 500 
Value-Weighted Market Index 2-year BHR for the same time period. In order to avoid the 
impact of large outliers on our results, the distribution of the 2-year ABHRs has been 
truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We opt for a two year event window to maximise 
the number of observations while ensuring a long-enough period to make appropriate 
assertions about performance longevity. To maintain independence of observations and avoid 
any bias in the analysis, we include only the acquisition with the highest deal value made by 
each firm (when there are more than one acquisitions made by one firm on the same date) and 
omit all further acquisition events taking place within two years.  
Panel A of Table 6 shows the 2-year ABHRs for both pre- and post-SOX periods. The 
results are quite similar to those of bidders’ CARs around acquisition announcements 
discussed in the previous section. There is evidence that the long-term post-acquisition 
performance of acquiring firm has been improved post-SOX but this is mainly due to a better 
post-acquisition stock price performance of Low IC firms. Firms that grant relatively low 
levels of incentive compensation to their managers, have significantly increased their average 
(median) ABHR from -2.38 percent (-9.94 percent) to 4.37 percent (-3.57 percent) and it is 
these types of firms that mainly drive the results of the whole sample. Prior to 2002, highly 
incentivised bidders seem to perform better than their low incentivised counterparts but this 
relation has been reversed post-SOX. However, the differences in ABHR between High and 
Low IC firms are not statistically significant for any of the two sub-periods
20
. 
  To investigate the determinants of long-term acquisition performance, we carry out a 
multivariate analysis of the 2-year ABHR on a number of control and explanatory variables 
that have been identified as important either by the literature or by our analysis so far. Panel 
B presents the results. The dependent variable is the acquirer’s ABHR defined as the 
difference between the natural logarithm of 1 + the acquirer’s 2-year post-acquisition BHR 
and the natural logarithm of 1 + the CRSP S&P 500 Value Weighted Index BHR for the same 
period. All independent variables are defined as in the previous sections. The simplified first 
model confirms the univariate findings of a significant improvement in bidder’s long-term 
                                                          
20 When we restrict our analysis to the period 1993-1998 we find a statistical significant (at the 1 percent level) 
outperformance of High IC firms which is totally in line with the findings of Datta et al., (2001). 
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post-acquisition stock price performance after the introduction of the Act. It is obvious 
though that a number of explanatory variables are missing from the analysis at this stage. 
The second model controls for the confounding events of internet crash, passage of SFAS 
No. 123R and financial crisis. It is important to control for these events as their expected 
negative impact on stock price performance can offset a possible positive effect of incentive 
compensation. Indeed, the coefficients of these variables are negative but only that of SFAS 
No. 123R is statistically significant (at the 1 percent level). Having found that cash 
acquisitions are those that drive the increase in bidders’ CARs around acquisition 
announcement post-SOX, it is important to test whether this factor can have an impact on 
long-term post-acquisition performance too. The coefficient of the Cash variable is positive 
but not statistically significant indicating that while the method of payment can affect the 
market reaction around the announcement date, it has no impact on the long term 
performance of the bidder. Based on Jensen’s (1988) free cash flow theory, we also examine 
whether past performance (Runup) can be related to post-acquisition long-term performance 
but no such relation is found. However, the results show that the documented increase in 
ABHRs post-SOX is due to a considerable improvement in the stock-price performance of 
high market-to-book value firms. While these types of firms perform poorly pre-SOX 
confirming the findings of Rau and Vermaelen (1998), they experience a significant increase 
in their long-term post-acquisition performance after the passage of the Act. What is more, 
the change in the coefficient of M/B between the pre- and post-SOX period (from -5 percent 
to +5 percent) is equal in size and statistical significance with the coefficient of SOX in the 
first model (10 percent). This indicates that firms with high growth opportunities are those 
that have managed to improve their long-term performance post-SOX. Growth can be 
correlated to frim size though as small firms may have more growth opportunities than large, 
established firms. Thus, we also control for size (Log_Sales) in our analysis. The results show 
a superior performance of large firms pre-SOX but firm size has no impact on our post-SOX 
findings.  
While model 2 reveals that the improvement in bidders’ post-acquisition performance after 
the passage of the Act can be attributed to a significant positive change in the stock price 
performance of growth firms, it doesn’t say anything about the role of incentive 
compensation. However, the univariate analysis (panel A) identifies the Low IC firms as 
those with a significant increase in their long-term acquisition performance post-SOX. 
Therefore, models 3 and 4 partition our sample to High and Low IC firms respectively to 
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investigate whether different levels of incentive compensation can affect the impact of the 
above factors on post-acquisition performance. While all high market-to-book ratio acquirers 
perform poorly before SOX, there is no improvement in the performance of these type of 
firms if their managers are granted high percentage of stock options and restricted stocks 
post-SOX.  In addition, highly incentivised bidders have been more adversely affected by 
events such as the passage of SFAS No. 123R and the downturn of the market following the 
crash of the internet bubble. In contrast, only growth firms that award to their directors low 
levels of incentive compensation post-SOX experience a significant improvement in their 
acquisition performance. The results also show that the superior performance of large firms 
before 2002 is linked to high incentive compensation adding to the better performance of 
High IC firms, compared to Low IC firms, in the pre-SOX era. In line with our findings in 
previous tables, the analysis of long-term acquisition performance indicates that after the 
passage of SOX, managerial incentives have changed and high incentive compensation is no 
longer such an effective mechanism in aligning the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders as it used to be in the past. The results could be also supportive of the findings 
of Bystrom (2012) who proposes that executive compensation should be asset-based rather 
than equity based so as a stronger link with actual long-term performance can be achieved. 
 
IV. Summary and Conclusions 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act had a major impact on the relationship between executive 
equity-related compensation and acquisition decisions. Our analysis of 7,859 mergers and 
acquisitions made by U.S. firms from January 1993 until December 2010 provides further 
evidence that companies reduced risk and risk-taking activities after the act was introduced 
(Cohen et al., 2012; Bargeron et al., 2010). Acquisitions made by firms with high levels of 
incentive compensation (IC) were significantly lower risky after SOX than they were 
beforehand.  Furthermore, whereas prior to SOX highly IC bidders made significantly more 
risky acquisitions than low IC firms, post-SOX, the relationship flipped completely. These 
results show that incentive compensation cannot offset the adverse impact of SOX in risk-
taking activity after 2002. What is more, the managers of acquiring firms whose 
compensation is more closely related to performance have become more risk averse post-
SOX. 
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While the effectiveness of incentive compensation has been reduced in the post-SOX 
period, the passage of the Act appears to have improved the quality of acquisition decisions 
reducing the agency costs between managers and shareholders. Bid premiums have 
considerably decreased irrespectively of the level of incentive compensation paid to directors. 
Since we find that higher bid premiums are not related to better post-acquisition performance, 
the decrease in acquisition premiums can be considered as a value creation (or less value 
destruction) for bidder’s shareholders.  Moreover, both the short-term and long-term stock 
price performance of acquirers have been improved post-SOX. After 2002, the market reacts 
more positively to acquisition announcements and more value is created for shareholders in 
the long-run. The results are robust for a number of confounding effects that could affect 
stock price performance in the same period. However, in contrast to the reduction in bid 
premiums, the improvement in acquisition performance is only evident for Low IC firms. 
More specifically, acquirers have largely substituted equity for cash as a method of payment 
post-SOX and the market perceives more positively cash acquisitions made by low 
incentivised managers. In addition, Low IC firms with high growth opportunities have 
managed to significantly improve their post-acquisition long-term performance. High IC 
firms on the other hand, have failed to capitalise any of these, beneficiary to shareholders, 
changes and their stock price performance is not considerably different than that of the pre-
SOX era. 
The argument in favour of a positive relation between incentive compensation and firm 
value (see, for example, Datta et al., 2001) cannot explain the relationships subsequent to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  What can explain this striking change in behaviours? A likely 
explanation is that the heightened accountability and more punitive legal response to poor 
decisions led highly incentivised managers to become more risk-averse. Even superior long-
term stock price performance which has been the strongest argument in support of equity-
related compensation now seems vulnerable. The introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has 
also reduced the strength of evidence supporting managerial hubris and entrenchment through 
the decrease of bid premiums and value destruction in corporate acquisitions. 
The key insight provided by the paper is that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act massively changed 
managerial incentives and this impacted upon their approach to major acquisition decisions 
and the effectiveness of incentive compensation. Not only were the real effects of these 
decisions affected but investors also recognised a difference in decision-making. The results 
are supportive of the decrease in incentive compensation post-SOX (Cohen et al., 2013) as 
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well as of acquirers’ choice to replace equity for cash as a payment method after 2002. They 
also confirm Dicks’ findings (2012) that in a corporate governance environment characterised 
by stricter regulation, less incentive compensation would be required to reduce agency costs. 
Future research should look into the change further and determine which firms were most 
sensitive to the effects of SOX and whether it can be exploited for value gain.   
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Table 1 - Distribution of Corporate Acquisitions 1993-2010 
 
The sample consists of 7,859 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010. The firms are 
listed in the Thomson One SDC database for Mergers and Acquisitions and have executive compensation data available in the 
Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. Deal value is taken from the Thomson One SDC database and refers to deal value at 
announcement date. Cash refers to corporate acquisitions financed with cash only. Equity refers to corporate acquisitions paid 100 
percent with stock. Mixed refers to a combination of cash, equity, debt, earnout and other method of financing. High IC refers to 
firms whose percentage of incentive compensation, which is defined as the sum of option and stock grants to the top-5 executives 
as percentage of their total compensation, is higher than the annual median of all S&P ExecuComp firms for that year; otherwise 
the firms are classified as Low IC. Acquisitions with an announcement date before 30 June 2002 are characterised as pre-SOX; 
otherwise they are classified as post-SOX. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year
Number of 
Acquisitions
% of 
Sample
Avg. Deal 
Value 
($ Millions)
Cash
% of 
Year
Equity
% of 
Year
Mixed
% of 
Year
1993 319 4.1% 148.53 119 (37.3%) 117 (36.7%) 83 (26.0%)
1994 354 4.5% 253.93 151 (42.7%) 116 (32.8%) 87 (24.6%)
1995 351 4.5% 434.85 135 (38.5%) 126 (35.9%) 90 (25.6%)
1996 466 5.9% 405.62 180 (38.6%) 158 (33.9%) 128 (27.5%)
1997 542 6.9% 443.47 192 (35.4%) 198 (36.5%) 152 (28.0%)
1998 583 7.4% 644.07 220 (37.7%) 207 (35.5%) 156 (26.8%)
1999 593 7.5% 907.25 260 (43.8%) 184 (31.0%) 149 (25.1%)
2000 534 6.8% 959.38 217 (40.6%) 155 (29.0%) 162 (30.3%)
2001 429 5.5% 660.39 218 (50.8%) 66 (15.4%) 145 (33.8%)
2002 448 5.7% 387.15 244 (54.5%) 35 (7.8%) 169 (37.7%)
2003 461 5.9% 422.81 284 (61.6%) 30 (6.5%) 147 (31.9%)
2004 482 6.1% 677.77 290 (60.2%) 30 (6.2%) 162 (33.6%)
2005 476 6.1% 949.13 286 (60.1%) 17 (3.6%) 173 (36.3%)
2006 446 5.7% 873.22 308 (69.1%) 19 (4.3%) 119 (26.7%)
2007 471 6.0% 555.16 307 (65.2%) 12 (2.5%) 152 (32.3%)
2008 358 4.6% 638.24 242 (67.6%) 13 (3.6%) 103 (28.8%)
2009 261 3.3% 1,004.89 164 (62.8%) 12 (4.6%) 85 (32.6%)
2010 285 3.6% 456.37 217 (76.1%) 5 (1.8%) 63 (22.1%)
Τotal 7859 100.0% 616.74 4034 (51.3%) 1500 (19.1%) 2325 (29.6%)
Panel A: Distribution of Corporate Acquisitions by Year & Method of Payment 1993-2010
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
 
Year
Number of 
Acquisitions
% of Sub-
Sample
Avg. Deal 
Value 
($ Millions)
Cash
% of 
Year
Equity
% of 
Year
Equity
Mixed
% of 
Year
1993 178 3.8% 177.52 66 (37.1%) 68 (38.2%) 44 (24.7%)
1994 204 4.3% 329.66 84 (41.2%) 69 (33.8%) 51 (25.0%)
1995 194 4.1% 466.27 77 (39.7%) 72 (37.1%) 45 (23.2%)
1996 253 5.4% 445.22 101 (39.9%) 85 (33.6%) 67 (26.5%)
1997 299 6.3% 471.48 112 (37.5%) 106 (35.5%) 81 (27.1%)
1998 373 7.9% 729.32 137 (36.7%) 143 (38.3%) 93 (24.9%)
1999 362 7.7% 862.32 142 (39.2%) 130 (35.9%) 90 (24.9%)
2000 334 7.1% 1,110.58 122 (36.5%) 113 (33.8%) 99 (29.6%)
2001 271 5.8% 726.57 145 (53.5%) 45 (16.6%) 81 (29.9%)
2002 258 5.5% 220.48 153 (59.3%) 19 (7.4%) 86 (33.3%)
2003 274 5.8% 547.88 171 (62.4%) 19 (6.9%) 84 (30.7%)
2004 297 6.3% 958.17 182 (61.3%) 19 (6.4%) 96 (32.3%)
2005 304 6.5% 773.38 197 (64.8%) 4 (1.3%) 103 (33.9%)
2006 253 5.4% 796.62 191 (75.5%) 8 (3.2%) 54 (21.3%)
2007 294 6.2% 655.70 193 (65.6%) 8 (2.7%) 93 (31.6%)
2008 206 4.4% 898.22 157 (76.2%) 8 (3.9%) 41 (19.9%)
2009 167 3.5% 1,302.90 112 (67.1%) 6 (3.6%) 49 (29.3%)
2010 190 4.0% 507.36 144 (75.8%) 3 (1.6%) 43 (22.6%)
Τotal 4711 100.0% 682.44 2486 (52.8%) 925 (19.6%) 1300 (27.6%)
Year
Number of 
Acquisitions
% of Sub-
Sample
Avg. Deal 
Value 
($ Millions)
Cash
% of 
Year
Equity
% of 
Year
Equity
Mixed
% of 
Year
1993 141 4.5% 111.94 53 (37.6%) 49 (34.8%) 39 (27.7%)
1994 150 4.8% 150.93 67 (44.7%) 47 (31.3%) 36 (24.0%)
1995 157 5.0% 396.03 58 (36.9%) 54 (34.4%) 45 (28.7%)
1996 213 6.8% 358.59 79 (37.1%) 73 (34.3%) 61 (28.6%)
1997 243 7.7% 409.01 80 (32.9%) 92 (37.9%) 71 (29.2%)
1998 210 6.7% 492.64 83 (39.5%) 64 (30.5%) 63 (30.0%)
1999 231 7.3% 977.68 118 (51.1%) 54 (23.4%) 59 (25.5%)
2000 200 6.4% 706.87 95 (47.5%) 42 (21.0%) 63 (31.5%)
2001 158 5.0% 546.87 73 (46.2%) 21 (13.3%) 64 (40.5%)
2002 190 6.0% 613.47 91 (47.9%) 16 (8.4%) 83 (43.7%)
2003 187 5.9% 239.53 113 (60.4%) 11 (5.9%) 63 (33.7%)
2004 185 5.9% 227.63 108 (58.4%) 11 (5.9%) 66 (35.7%)
2005 172 5.5% 1,259.74 89 (51.7%) 13 (7.6%) 70 (40.7%)
2006 193 6.1% 973.64 117 (60.6%) 11 (5.7%) 65 (33.7%)
2007 177 5.6% 388.16 114 (64.4%) 4 (2.3%) 59 (33.3%)
2008 152 4.8% 285.89 85 (55.9%) 5 (3.3%) 62 (40.8%)
2009 94 3.0% 475.44 52 (55.3%) 6 (6.4%) 36 (38.3%)
2010 95 3.0% 354.37 73 (76.8%) 2 (2.1%) 20 (21.1%)
Τotal 3148 100.0% 518.43 1548 (49.2%) 575 (18.3%) 1025 (32.6%)
Panel C: Distribution of Corporate Acquisitions by Low IC firms by Year & Method of Payment
Panel B: Distribution of Corporate Acquisitions by High IC firms by Year & Method of Payment
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Table 2 - Compensation Characteristics of Acquirers’ Top Five Executives 
 
The sample consists of 7,859 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010. The firms are listed in the Thomson One database for Mergers and Acquisitions and have executive 
compensation data available in the Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. All compensation data has been sampled at the year-end preceding the corporate acquisition announcement. Total compensation is 
defined as the sum of salary, bonus, grant-date fair value of stock awards, total value of stock options granted and other forms of annual compensation. Under the 1992 reporting format, other forms of 
compensation include other (short-term) annual compensation, long-term incentives payouts and all other long-term compensation while under the 2006 reporting format, other forms of compensation include 
non-equity incentive plan compensation, deferred compensation earnings reported as compensation and other compensation awarded to the top five executives. Out of 7,859 acquisitions in the sample, bidders 
awarded new option and/or stock grants in 7,104 acquisitions. Acquisitions with an announcement date before 30 June 2002 are characterised as pre-SOX; otherwise they are classified as post-SOX. High IC 
refers to firms whose percentage of incentive compensation is higher than the annual median of all S&P ExecuComp firms for that year; otherwise the firms are classified as low IC. ***,**,* indicate significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Compensation ($ 000s) Mean Median
Standard
Deviation
Observations
Percentage
of Total
Compensation
Mean Median
Standard
Deviation
Observations
Percentage
of Total
Compensation
Difference
in Mean
Difference
in Median
Salary 2,277.74             2,063.11             1,142.34             4,431               14.46% 2,503.09             2,259.56             1,183.60             3,412               13.46% -225.35*** -196.45***
Bonus 2,332.74             1,269.54             5,445.29             4,193               14.81% 2,575.19             1,058.30             7,140.44             2,674               13.85% -242.45* 211.24***
Stock Grants 900.51                0.00 3,844.28 1,052               5.72% 3,614.05             341.16 7,875.01 1,856               19.44% -2713.54*** -341.16***
Option Grants 9,120.88             2,382.61             25,552.77          3,792               57.90% 7,546.71             2,634.18             18,531.89          2,719               40.59% 1574.17*** -251.56
Other Forms of Compensation 1,121.21             199.97                3,613.23             4,199               7.12% 2,353.90             567.93                5,062.35             3,314               12.66% -1232.69*** -367.96***
Total Compensation 15,753.09          7,345.43             28,761.89          4,435               100.00% 18,592.95          10,371.46          25,923.55          3,424               100.00% -2839.86*** -3026.03***
Incentive Compensation (%) 41.77                   40.91                   27.98                   3,917               47.16                   49.75                   24.51                   3,187               -5.39*** -8.84***
Compensation ($ 000s)
Non-Acquirers
Mean
Non-Acuirers
Median
Percentage
of Total
Compensation
Difference
in Mean
Difference
in Median
Non-Acquirers
Mean
Non-Acuirers
Median
Percentage
of Total
Compensation
Difference
in Mean
Difference
in Median
coefficient t-stat
Salary 2,099.25             1,859.05             20.54% 178.49*** 204.06*** 2,343.65             2,153.95             19.88% 159.44*** 105.61*** -19.06 -0.49
Bonus 1,746.44             750.48                17.08% 586.30*** 519.06*** 1,325.06             228.69                11.24% 1250.14*** 829.61*** 663.83 3.66***
Stock Grants 663.01                0.00 6.49% 237.50*** 0.00 2,959.76             459.24 25.11% 654.29*** -118.07 416.79 2.21**
Option Grants 4,764.89             1,132.11             46.61% 4355.99*** 1250.50*** 2,729.48             722.07                23.15% 4817.24*** 1912.11*** 461.25 0.74
Other Forms of Compensation 948.63                166.75                9.28% 172.58** 33.22*** 2,430.99             951.74                20.62% -77.09 -383.80*** -249.66   -1.71*
Total Compensation 10,222.23          5,098.02             100.00% 5530.86*** 2247.41*** 11,788.94          7,795.55             100.00% 6804.01*** 2575.91*** 1273.15 1.62
Incentive Compensation (%) 33.09                   29.84                   8.68*** 11.07*** 36.03                   38.96                   11.13*** 10.79*** 2.45 2.76***
Difference in Difference
Panel A: Change in Compensation Characteristics for the Total Sample of M&As
Pre-SOX Post-SOX
Panel B: Compensation Characteristics for Non-Acquiring Firms and comparison with M&As Sample
Pre-SOX Post-SOX
32 
 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Compensation ($ 000s) Mean Median
Standard
Deviation
Observations
Percentage
of Total
Compensation
Mean Median
Standard
Deviation
Observations
Percentage
of Total
Compensation
Difference
in Mean
Difference
in Median
Salary 2,367.05             2,146.87             1,154.33             2,615               11.02% 2,604.64             2,401.66             1,127.53             2,080               10.90% -237.59*** -254.80***
Bonus 2,361.45             1,330.94             3,599.08             2,469               10.99% 2,606.19             1,078.46             6,038.59             1,579               10.91% -244.74 252.48***
Stock Grants 1,380.65             0.00 4,749.56 757                  6.43% 5,255.25             1,525.45 9,415.13 1,303               22.00% -3874.60*** -1525.45***
Option Grants 14,511.06          5,609.82             32,014.85          2,577               67.54% 11,261.36          5,385.72             22,754.80          1,840               47.14% 3249.70*** 224.10***
Other Forms of Compensation 863.73                185.76                2,368.18             2,477               4.02% 2,160.06             557.57                3,949.36             2,021               9.04% -1296.33*** -371.41***
Total Compensation 21,483.95          11,482.14          34,483.54          2,619               100.00% 23,887.50          14,999.57          29,105.74          2,092               100.00% -2403.56*** -3517.43***
Incentive Compensation (%) 60.20                   60.02                   19.26                   2,619               63.29                   61.22                   13.55                   2,092               -3.08*** -1.20***
Compensation ($ 000s) Mean Median
Standard
Deviation
Observations
Percentage
of Total
Compensation
Mean Median
Standard
Deviation
Observations
Percentage
of Total
Compensation
Difference
in Mean
Difference
in Median
Salary 2,148.94             1,931.16             1,112.59             1,816               28.70% 2,343.60             2,088.83             1,250.54             1,332               22.80% -194.65*** -157.66***
Bonus 2,291.34             1,196.08             7,331.44             1,724               30.60% 2,526.51             1,007.86             8,592.63             1,095               24.58% -235.17 188.22***
Stock Grants 208.07                0.00 1,659.04 295                  2.78% 1,036.43             0.00 3,057.11 553                  10.08% -828.36*** 0.00***
Option Grants 1,347.26             436.24                3,784.91             1,215               17.99% 1,712.60             644.93                3,746.27             879                  16.66% -365.33*** -208.68***
Other Forms of Compensation 1,492.54             221.99                4,855.00             1,722               19.93% 2,658.34             577.91                6,422.76             1,293               25.87% -1165.80*** -355.93***
Total Compensation 7,488.16             4,383.39             13,783.94          1,816               100.00% 10,277.47          5,616.88             16,857.43          1,332               100.00% -2789.31*** -1233.49***
Incentive Compensation (%) 15.19                   13.93                   13.39                   1,298               21.83                   24.44                   14.34                   1,095               -6.65*** -10.51***
Compensation ($ 000s) Mean Median t-statistic z-statistic Mean Median t-statistic z-statistic coefficient t-stat
Salary 218.11 215.70 6.32*** 6.63*** 261.05 312.84 6.18*** 8.40*** 42.94 0.80
Bonus 70.11 134.86 0.38 3.94*** 79.68 70.60 0.30 0.02 9.57 0.03
Stock Grants 1172.57 0.00 11.65*** 11.52*** 4218.82 1525.45 18.98*** 18.21*** 3046.25 11.35***
Option Grants 13163.80 5173.57 20.83*** 45.00*** 9548.76 4740.80 18.80*** 30.68*** -3615.03 -3.53***
Other Forms of Compensation -628.81 -36.23 -5.11*** -3.20*** -498.28 -20.34 -2.54** -0.13 130.53 0.65
Total Compensation 13995.79 7098.75 18.73*** 31.62*** 13610.03 9382.69 17.31*** 27.93*** -385.76 -0.31
Incentive Compensation (%) 45.02 46.09 91.81*** 53.52*** 41.46 36.78 84.26*** 49.30*** -3.56 -4.86***
Difference in Difference
Panel D: Change in Compensation Characteristics for Low IC Firms
Pre-SOX Post-SOX
Panel E: Difference in Compensation Characteristics between High and Low IC Firms (Panel C - Panel D)
Pre-SOX Post-SOX
Pre-SOX Post-SOX
Panel C: Change in Compensation Characteristics for High IC Firms
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Table 3 – Change in Acquirer Risk 
 
The sample consists of 7,859 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010. The firms are 
listed in the Thomson One database for Mergers and Acquisitions and have executive compensation data available in the Standard 
and Poor’s ExecuComp database. All compensation data has been sampled at the year-end prior to the corporate acquisition 
announcement. Acquisitions with an announcement date before 30 June 2002 are characterised as pre-SOX; otherwise they are 
classified as post-SOX. High IC refers to firms whose percentage of incentive compensation is higher than the annual median of 
all S&P ExecuComp firms for that year; otherwise the firms are classified as low IC. The standard deviation of stock returns is 
computed during two time periods: the post-acquisition period (126 trading days following the effective date) and the pre-
acquisition period (126 trading days preceding the effective date). Panel B presents the 3SLS results regarding the change in 
standard deviation of stock returns around acquisitions. Incentive Compensation is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when 
the firm is characterised as High IC. SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement was made 
on or after the 30th of July 2002. Internet B.Crash refers to acquisition announcements made in 2000 and 2001 and it is the decile 
ranking of cumulative returns between August 2000 and August 2001 where the highest decile corresponds to the most positive 
returns. SFAS123R is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement has been made in 2006. 
Log_Sales is the logarithm of sales. Ownership is the sum of stocks owned by the top five executives at the year-end prior to the 
announcement as a ratio of total shares outstanding. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Decrease in Leverage is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm has reduced its leverage from the year end preceding the announcement to the 
acquisition announcement year end. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Test-statistics for the 3SLS regressions are in parentheses. 
 
 
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Mean 0.11% 0.02% 0.14% 0.00% 0.07% 0.05% 0.07% -0.05%
Median 0.03% -0.03% 0.04% -0.04% 0.03% -0.01% 0.02% -0.04%
Observations 4,245 3,346 2,521 2,047 1,724 1,299
t statistic 2.72*** -1.76*
z statistic 1.58 -1.86*
Intercept
Incentive Compensation
SOX
IC x SOX
Internet B.Crash
SFAS 123R
Log_Sales
SOX x Log_Sales
Ownership
SOX x Ownership
Leverage
SOX x Decrease in Leverage
Observations
p-value
Χ2
(-0.89)
0.1190*
(1.95)
-0.1129***
(-3.66)
6,983
0.000
78.78
7,591
0.000
43.61
0.1089***
(3.69)
-0.0563
(-0.53)
-0.1832***
(-4.21)
-0.0242***
(-4.43)
-0.0873*
(-1.92)
0.0088
(0.39)
0.0414
(1.33)
0.4867**
(2.13)
-0.3540
7,591
0.000
28.26
0.0813***
(2.97)
-0.0170
(-0.52)
-0.1376***
(-3.33)
-0.0186***
(-3.62)
-0.0659
(-1.47)
-0.1260***
(-3.06)
(3.11) (-0.02)(3.80)
0.0714***
(2.62)
-0.0104
(-0.33)
Panel B: 3SLS estimation of change in Standard Deviation of Stock Returns around Acquisitions
Post Minus Pre 
Acquisition ST.DEV.
Model 2
Post Minus Pre 
Acquisition ST.DEV.
Model 3
Post Minus Pre 
Acquisition ST.DEV.
Model 1
0.0654*** 0.0816*** -0.0019
Panel A: Post-acquisition Minus Pre-acquisition Stock Return Standard Deviation
Total Sample High IC Low IC High vs Low IC
4.27*** 5.09*** 0.34
5.03*** 5.22*** 1.45
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Table 4 – Size of Acquisition Premium pre and post-SOX. 
 
The sample consists of 7,859 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010. The firms are listed in 
the Thomson One database for Mergers and Acquisitions and have executive compensation data available in the Standard and Poor’s 
ExecuComp database. All compensation data has been sampled at the year-end prior to the corporate acquisition announcement. 
Acquisitions with an announcement date before 30 June 2002 are characterised as pre-SOX; otherwise they are classified as post-SOX. 
High IC refers to firms whose percentage of incentive compensation is higher than the annual median of all S&P ExecuComp firms for 
that year; otherwise the firms are classified as low IC. Incentive Compensation is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm 
is characterised as High IC. SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement was made on or after the 
30th of July 2002. Internet B.Cash refers to acquisition announcements made in 2000 and 2001 and it is the decile ranking of cumulative 
returns between August 2000 and August 2001 where the highest decile corresponds to the most positive returns. Fin.Crisis is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement has been made in years 2007, 2008 and 2009. M/B is the market-to-
book ratio and is based at the month-end prior to the acquisition announcement date as book value of total assets minus book value of 
equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of total assets. Ownership is the sum of stocks owned by the top five 
executives at the year-end prior to the announcement as a ratio of total shares outstanding. Cash is a dummy variable taking the value of 
1 if the transaction has been financed entirely by cash. Equity is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the transaction has been 
financed 100 percent with equity. Runup is the abnormal buy-and-hold stock return for one year preceding the acquisition. 2-
year_ABHRs is the two-year abnormal buy-and-hold stock return following the acquisition. In panel A, t-statistics are from the t-test of 
difference between means and z-statistics are from the Wilcoxon rank sum test for difference between the respective distributions. In 
panel B, t-statistics based on robust, heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 
1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Mean 48.04 38.71 48.80 39.37 46.79 37.39 2.00 1.98
Median 40.53 31.27 42.21 31.82 39.00 29.72 3.21 2.10
Observations 1,030 594 642 396 388 198
t statistic 0.92 0.78
z statistic 1.03 1.26
Panel A: Change in Acquisition Premium (%) between pre and post-SOX
Total Sample High IC Low IC High vs Low IC
5.88*** 4.80*** 3.47***
6.08*** 4.78*** 3.84***
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Table 4 (Continued)  
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept
Incentive Compensation
SOX
IC x SOX
Internet B.Crash
Fin.Crisis
M/B
SOX x M/B
Ownership
SOX x Ownership
Cash
SOX x Cash
Equity
SOX x Equity
Runup
SOX x Runup
2-year_ABHRs
SOX x 2-year_ABHRs
Observations
p-value
F-statistic
1.6017
(0.49)
5.3777
(1.26)
-4.9391*
(-1.90)
-4.7494
(-1.22)
5.4994*
0.9009*
(1.80)
0.4883
(0.39)
7.8015
(0.35)
-3.4501
(-0.09)
-0.3088
(-0.13)
-12.6437***
(-3.17)
-0.0482
(-0.01)
0.6692
(0.20)
1.1982**
(2.55)
4.6176*
(1.80)
0.000
8.90
1,440
0.000
7.39
1,447
0.000
7.59
(-2.78)
-0.8789
(-0.24)
0.4282
(0.23)
4.8187
(1.06)
(1.72)
-8.1678*
(-1.91)
0.000
11.88
1,624 1,624
0.0130
(0.00)
(27.57) (25.90)
1.9845
(0.92)
-9.4050***
(-3.46)
Panel B: Multivariate Regressions on the size of Acquisition Premium
Acq. Premium
Model 4
Acq. Premium
Model 1
46.7990*** 47.1809***
Acq. Premium
Model 2
Acq. Premium
Model 3
45.8231*** 47.2181***
(26.78) (17.26)
1.3049
(0.60)
-9.9684***
(-3.53)
2.2628
(0.99)
-8.4327***
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Table 5 - Two-Day (-1,0) Acquirer’s Cumulative Abnormal Returns at Acquisition Announcement 
 
The sample consists of 7,859 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010. The two-day (-1,0) 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) have been computed using the market model estimated by OLS regression: 
 
The estimation period is measured from 220 days to 20 days prior to the acquisition announcement date. To maintain independence of 
the results, we include only the transaction with the highest deal value when a firm has more than one acquisition announcements on the 
same date as well as those acquisitions with an announcement date at least 320 calendar days later than the previous acquisition 
announcement for the same firm. This results to a sample of 4,962 observations. The firms are listed in the Thomson One SDC database 
for Mergers and Acquisitions and have executive compensation data available in the ExecuComp database. All compensation data has 
been sampled at the year-end prior to the corporate acquisition announcement. Acquisitions with an announcement date before 30 June 
2002 are characterised as pre-SOX; otherwise they are classified as post-SOX. High IC refers to firms whose percentage of incentive 
compensation is higher than the annual median of all S&P ExecuComp firms for that year; otherwise the firms are classified as low IC. 
Incentive Compensation is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm is characterised as High IC. SOX is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement is made on or after the 30th of July 2002. Internet B.Cash refers to acquisition 
announcements made in 2000 and 2001 and it is the decile ranking of cumulative returns between August 2000 and August 2001 where 
the highest decile corresponds to the most positive returns. Fin.Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition 
announcement has been made in years 2007, 2008 and 2009. SFAS123R is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition 
announcement has been made in 2006. M/B is the market-to-book ratio and is based at the month-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement date as book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of total 
assets. Ownership is the sum of stocks owned by the top five executives at the year-end prior to the announcement as a ratio of total 
shares outstanding. Cash is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the transaction has been financed entirely by cash. Equity is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the transaction has been financed 100 percent with equity. Runup is the abnormal buy-and-hold 
stock return for one year preceding the acquisition. In panel A, t-statistics are from the t-test of difference between means and z-statistics 
are from the Wilcoxon rank sum test for difference between the respective distributions. In panel B, t-statistics based on robust, 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Mean 0.15% 0.23% 0.18% 0.08% 0.13% 0.44% 0.05% -0.36%
Median -0.06% 0.02% 0.00% -0.08% -0.10% 0.14% 0.10% -0.22%
Observations 2,673 2,289 1,507 1,346 1,166 943
t statistic 0.29 -2.31**
z statistic 0.30 -1.69*
Panel A: Bidders' CARs (-1,0) around Acquisition Announcement categorised by level of Incentive 
Compensation & Announcement Period
Total Sample High IC Low IC High vs Low IC
-0.65 0.62 -1.76*
-1.28 -0.11 -1.88*
'
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept
Incentive Compensation
SOX
IC x SOX
Internet B.Crash
Fin.Crisis
SFAS123R
M/B
SOX x M/B
Ownership
SOX x Ownership
Cash
SOX x Cash
Equity
SOX x Equity
Runup
SOX x Runup
Observations
p-value
F-statistic
(0.97) (-0.09)
0.0514
(0.29)
0.3136*
(1.76)
Panel B: Multivariate Regressions on Bidder's CARs around Acquisition Announcement
CARs (-1,0)
Model 4
CARs (-1,0)
Model 1
0.1258 -0.0157
CARs (-1,0)
Model 2
CARs (-1,0)
Model 3
0.1467 -0.1398
(1.11) (-0.60)
0.0617
(0.35)
0.3513*
(1.83)
0.1631
(0.91)
0.1918
-0.4073*
(-1.74)
0.127
1.90
4,962 4,962
(0.69)
-0.5629**
(-2.34)
-0.0962**
(-2.17)
0.0916527
1.02
-0.3979**
(-2.16)
4,776
0.000
4.86
0.6764***
(3.83)
-0.1461
(-0.60)
(0.13)
0.2438
-0.4266*
(-1.82)
-0.0254
(-0.55)
-0.0229
(-0.13)
-0.3594*
(-1.86)
0.7447***
(3.33)
-0.3125
0.172
1.50
4,366
0.000
3.10
(0.62)
-0.1377**
(-2.19)
0.0828
(0.81)
1.82134
(1.16)
1.0461
(0.41)
0.2611
(1.36)
0.3308
(1.04)
-0.6168**
(-2.45)
(-1.11)
0.0049
(0.02)
-0.8527
(-1.43)
0.0357
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Table 6 - Two-year Abnormal Buy-and-Hold Post-Acquisition Performance for Acquiring Firms 
 
The sample consists of 7,859 acquisitions completed during the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010. To avoid biasness in the 
results, when a firm has made more than one acquisitions on the same date, we include the acquisition with the highest deal value and 
only those acquisitions with an effective date at least two years later than the previous acquisition for the same firm. Furthermore, the 
distribution of acquirers’ post-acquisition stock price performance has been truncated at its 1st and 99th percentiles to exclude the impact 
of outliers, restricting the sample to 3,429 observations. The buy-and-hold return on stock i, BHRi, is calculated as 
, , ,
1
(1 ) 1 100
T
i t T i t
t
BHR R

 
    
 
  
where t = 1 represents the first day of trading following the effective date of the acquisition, Ri,t indicates the stock price return of firm i 
on day t and Ti is the two-year anniversary date of the effective acquisition date. The Abnormal BHRi is calculated as the difference 
between the acquirer’s 2-year post-acquisition BHR and the CRSP S&P 500 Value Weighted Index BHR for the same period. The firms 
are listed in the Thomson One SDC database for Mergers and Acquisitions and have executive compensation data available in the 
ExecuComp database. All compensation data has been sampled at the year-end prior to the corporate acquisition announcement. 
Acquisitions with an announcement date before 30 June 2002 are characterised as pre-SOX; otherwise they are classified as post-SOX. 
High IC refers to firms whose percentage of incentive compensation is higher than the annual median of all S&P ExecuComp firms for 
that year; otherwise the firms are classified as low IC. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the acquirer’s ABHR defined as the 
difference between the natural logarithm of 1 + the acquirer’s 2-year post-acquisition BHR and the natural logarithm of 1 + the CRSP 
S&P 500 Value Weighted Index BHR for the same period. Incentive Compensation is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the 
firm is characterised as High IC. SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement is made on or after 
the 30th of July 2002. Internet B.Cash refers to acquisition announcements made in 2000 and 2001 and it is the decile ranking of 
cumulative returns between August 2000 and August 2001 where the highest decile corresponds to the most positive returns. Fin.Crisis 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement has been made in years 2007, 2008 and 2009. SFAS123R is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition announcement has been made in 2006. M/B is the market-to-book ratio and 
is based at the month-end prior to the acquisition announcement date as book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus 
market value of equity divided by book value of total assets. Log_Sales is the logarithm of sales. Cash is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if the transaction has been financed entirely by cash. Runup is the abnormal buy-and-hold stock return for one year preceding 
the acquisition. In panel A, t-statistics are from the t-test of difference between means and z-statistics are from the Wilcoxon rank sum 
test for difference between the respective distributions. In panel B, t-statistics based on robust, heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Pre
SOX
Post
SOX
Mean -1.05% 2.72% 0.11% 1.52% -2.38% 4.37% 2.49% -2.86%
Median -7.90% -4.49% -6.26% -5.03% -9.94% -3.57% 3.68% -1.45%
Observations 1,806 1,623 966 936 840 687
t statistic 0.77 -1.13
z statistic 0.85 -1.04
Panel A: Two-year Post-acquisition Abnormal BHRs for Acquiring Firms 
Total Sample High IC Low IC High vs Low IC
-1.85* -0.51 -2.22**
-3.67*** -1.83* -3.45***
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Table 6 (Continue) 
 
 
Intercept
Incentive Compensation
SOX
IC x SOX
Internet B.Crash
Fin.Crisis
SFAS123R
M/B
SOX x M/B
Log_Sales
SOX x Log_Sales
Cash
SOX x Cash
Runup
SOX x Runup
Observations
p-value
F-statistic
0.0195
(0.97)
0.0719**
(2.36)
-0.0375
(-1.02)
0.0786
(0.59)
-0.0234**
(-2.28)
-0.0343
0.000
5.07
1,801
0.000
3.87
(1.02)(0.57)
(-1.75)
0.0815
-0.0443
(-1.16)
-0.0029
(-0.33)
-0.0367
(-1.45)
-0.0491***
-(4.36)
0.0497***
-0.1518***
(-3.75)
0.0040
(0.09)
0.0827
-0.0454
(-1.22)
0.0306
(1.51)
-0.1015*
(-1.04)
-0.0329**
(-2.34)
1,465
0.000
3.88
0.0397
(0.98)
0.0138
(0.25)
0.0070
(0.16)
-0.0115
(-0.17)
(0.41)
0.0277*
(1.73)
-0.0584
(-1.00)
(-1.44)
-0.0723***
(-3.95)
0.1128***
(3.95)
0.0203
(0.61)
-0.0417
-0.0907*
(-1.82)
(2.13)
0.000
10.09
3,429 3,266
-0.0341
(-1.24)
0.0237
(0.80)
0.0480
(1.24)
(2.98)
0.0476**
(-55.85) (-9.79)
-0.0325
(-1.05)
0.1015***
(3.67)
Panel B: Multivariate Regressions Explaining Two-year Abnormal BHRs for Acquiring Firms
ABHRs
Low IC
ABHRs
Model 1
-1.1974*** -1.1470***
ABHRs
Model 2
ABHRs
High IC
-1.2321*** -1.3052***
(-15.93) (-12.16)
0.0011
(0.04)
0.09456
(0.98)
0.0606
-0.1971***
(-3.20)
0.0043
(0.11)
